

Summary of Discussions

**SWP/SSI Working Group
"Divergent Perspectives on Military Transformation"**

2nd Colloquium, Carlisle, PA, April 15-16, 2005
at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute

SWP

Key Insights:

- Recent experiences suggest that militaries should devote greater preparation, training, and resources for stabilization and reconstruction operations
- Transformation is not industry-led, but industry supported. The government and military remain the vehicles for change and must tell industry of its needs, not what industry can provide.
- The need for adaptive, innovative, and creative leaders is crucial in meeting current and future security challenges. A new leadership culture must evolve if the military is to meet these challenges.
- Technological superiority does not always translate to success in the Joint Operational Environment. An over-reliance on high technology risks consigning the United States to shouldering greater burdens because of the interoperability gap with allies. Moreover, the United States may be tempted to address a problem with high tech weapons instead of more appropriate means.

The U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs conducted the second in a series of conferences titled "Divergent Perspectives on Military Transformation" at Carlisle Barracks, PA, 15-16 April 2005. Over 20 participants attended the conference, to include representatives from Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands. U.S. participation included representatives from National Defense University, Boeing, General Dynamics, and the U.S. Army.

Panel 1: Security Transformation vs. Military Transformation – the case of Stabilization Operations

Over time, the U.S. military has become more efficient and effective in fighting high-intensity wars. Iraq has been the latest, impressive example. However, following the cessation of major combat operations – during the stabilization and reconstruction phase (S&R)– it is difficult to find evidence of comparable improvement. S&R may involve a challenging mix of counterinsurgency, peacekeeping and reconstruction. The obvious conclusion is that the military

Summary of Discussions

**SWP/SSI Working Group
"Divergent Perspectives on Military Transformation"**

2nd Colloquium, Carlisle, PA, April 15-16, 2005
at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute

SWP

needs to place more emphasis on training for S&R and work on building a bridge between the combat phase and the S&R phase.

One approach to addressing the capability deficit is the development of specialized forces for S&R missions. Particularly from a German perspective, the future operational environment suggests a different set of forces and resources from war fighting--technology plays at best a supporting role for enhanced communication and personal protection. In particular, the mental preparation for S&R is completely different. In this regard, the United States could set up an S&R Joint command, which would also monitor training and develop doctrine. On the civilian side, there is currently a bill in Congress to strengthen civilian S&R, which would set aside personnel for responding to crises, and establish an education and training center.

However, there are also reasons to be skeptical of creating a different set of forces for S&R. In an operational environment like Iraq, soldiers are required to switch quickly between the different phases of conflict. Similarly, the military should not train soldiers (at high cost) to do reconstruction because civilians are already trained to perform these tasks (e.g., repairs to utilities). The military should be able focus on the task of providing stabilization (e.g., security). Rather than building different sets of forces, a change in military culture to endorse the "lesser included" case seems of primary importance. Interestingly, the European countries that have deployed to Iraq have decided to abstain from creating different force structures for S&R operations.

It is commonly asserted that Europeans are more effective during post-war stabilization phase, given their mental preparedness to accept S&R as an integral part of their mission.

Summary of Discussions

**SWP/SSI Working Group
"Divergent Perspectives on Military Transformation"**

2nd Colloquium, Carlisle, PA, April 15-16, 2005
at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute

SWP

However, this assumption remains shaky since most European states have not conducted S&R in an operational environment like Iraq. Nevertheless, one transatlantic approach could be a division of labor that would give Europeans primary responsibility for S&R operations. The problems with such an arrangement include (1) the Europeans wanting a say in deciding when to go to war and (2) the Europeans focusing their modernization and transformation efforts on S&R and neglecting the balance of their military forces. In the long run, this option is politically not sustainable. What is required in a transatlantic context is a greater emphasis on a second pillar of force transformation which focuses on the dimensions of low-intensity conflicts and its related consequence for the armed forces. In this regard, particularly the concept of effects-based operations deserves greater emphasis.

Panel II: Business Dimensions of Transformation

Although industry attempts to predict where the market is going so that it can develop products to satisfy the future demands of the military, transformation is ultimately less about technology and more about how to engage the customer in a close dialogue about future solutions to problems (i.e. transformation is not industry-led, but industry supported). Science is to a large extent driving the future requirements – the customer, (i.e. government), wants to take advantage of innovations in the industrial world and apply them to military products. However, the complexity of modern systems prevents governments from becoming expert in many different fields and this creates the need for governments to rely more on the private sector.

One way that the private sector will become more involved is by assuming the lead system integrator (LSI) role traditionally played by the government and become the overall

Summary of Discussions

**SWP/SSI Working Group
"Divergent Perspectives on Military Transformation"**

2nd Colloquium, Carlisle, PA, April 15-16, 2005
at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute

SWP

manager of products. However, the extent governments and business are willing to go with the LSI model requires further assessment. For a company, the business case for being an LSI is not so good. Suppliers and platform builders make money, whereas LSIs take a lot of risk without a correspondingly high amount of compensation. LSI responsibility often includes some of the requirements generation process, and this may not be the best model because industry will tend to set requirements based on what they already have, thereby reducing competition and innovation. In Germany, the government is not ready to forego its LSI role fully because there is still some distrust of industry.

Panel III: Human Dimensions of Transformation

Transformation extends beyond technological dimensions, and humans should be in the center. Soldiers need to be “Adaptive Leaders”: innovative, adaptive and creative, operate on the fly, with little or no supervision. In post war Iraq, junior leaders found themselves in an environment where they were moving beyond doctrine and training and could not easily adapt/create. Over time, given that they were dispersed geographically and had a lot more operating information than senior officers, the junior officers learned to be creative and adaptive. However, in the US military, it has been hard to develop such leaders because the prevailing culture encourages compliance instead of creativity and reaction instead of pro-action.

One proposal for helping to develop a new culture would permit company commanders greater freedom in developing their training calendars rather than trying to develop it after the plethora of training requirements from higher echelons of command. Although the senior leadership endorses such a proposal, it faces significant resistance from mid-level officers with

*Summary of Discussions***SWP/SSI Working Group
"Divergent Perspectives on Military Transformation"****SWP**2nd Colloquium, Carlisle, PA, April 15-16, 2005
at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute

an “institutional army” framework, who fear that such an experiment would endanger force readiness. From their perspective the goal of making creative, adaptive leaders was deemed to risky. Other suggestions for improving officers include sending more to civilian universities for advanced degrees, but Army culture undervalues that kind of experience, and it thus reduces the chances of an officer getting selected for command. Nevertheless, given that the Army Chief of Staff is directly involved and is very outspoken in support of developing adaptive leaders, those who are resisting change will find themselves slowly pushed out of system.

In contrast, the German army has a tradition for developing adaptive leaders. The current tendency is to rely more on junior officers, which is supported by societal trend towards individualization. This, for example, has created a culture where it is easier for German soldiers to go to stabilization missions and respect the people and cultures around them.

Briefing and Debate on the Joint Operational Environment

War gaming is used to examine irregular threats, catastrophic events and disruptive events, providing rigor and relevance for the development of joint/army concepts and doctrine. Current trends revolve around failing states, transnational terrorism, urban warfare, non-state combatants, strained ethnic and cultural relations and niche technical parity. Future trends include population growth and urbanization, resource competition, transparent borders, technology proliferation and high rate of change. Globalization has enabled the rapid spread of technology such that the superiority of US forces may no longer be assured.

The participants identified several factors that should be considered in the context of a joint operational environment, including: (1) emphasizing interagency cooperation and the

*Summary of Discussions***SWP/SSI Working Group
"Divergent Perspectives on Military Transformation"****SWP**2nd Colloquium, Carlisle, PA, April 15-16, 2005
at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute

interdependence of the armed forces; (2) placing military action within a political context; and (3) de-emphasizing the notion of a homogeneous force, (i.e. Future Combat System), in favor of a mixed force. The participants questioned whether it is necessary or wise for the joint operational concept to rely on the tenet of U.S. strategy that the United States must be superior across the entire spectrum of military mission. What is meant by superiority? Did the United States even use its superiority in Somalia? In Iraq, the United States is superior, but it is not decisive.

There is also some concern about the heavy emphasis on technology, in terms of the threats and responses thereto, because it is not necessarily consistent with the real threat from the low-tech opponents of the last 15 years: for example, the use of IEDs, and the use of RPGs against helicopters. The focus on high tech leads to exceedingly high costs which prevent allies from operating with the US military easily. The forces, by default, conducted a strategy of rapid in/out expeditionary warfare which leads to destruction. Although such an approach might be the most rational choice (i.e. regime change and withdrawal), it is politically unacceptable. Moreover, the existence of sophisticated weapons technology inclines a state to think in terms of resolving a conflict by military means even if it undermines other elements of National Security Strategy.

Conclusions

The current strategic environment requires the shedding of the Cold War security concepts, which although created unprecedented stability, nonetheless are no long appropriate to addressing new challenges. Transformation is the intellectual vehicle for making these changes.

Summary of Discussions

**SWP/SSI Working Group
"Divergent Perspectives on Military Transformation"**

2nd Colloquium, Carlisle, PA, April 15-16, 2005
at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute

SWP

Force structure, leadership training, and technological requirements must address not only the current challenges, but also anticipate future challenges to preclude fighting the wrong war with the wrong force from the wrong time.