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The transformation of military forces to adapt to a rapidly changing
security environment has become a cornerstone in transatlantic security
relations. Driven by the United States, the initialization of the NATO
Response Force in October 2003 seemed to indicate a European
willingness to meet U.S. demands for a NATO transformed: rapidly
deployable forces to engage in global theaters. A closer look, however,
reveals the need for a substantial transatlantic dialogue on
transformation. For the issues involved do have the potential for
actually eroding the transatlantic partnership. In the wake of
September 11, a combination of weapons of mass destruction,
international terrorist networks, rogue states and failed states has
become of top concern to U.S. policy makers. The concept of preemption
to win the "global war on terror" is likely to drive and accelerate
U.S. forces transformation with a focus on high-intensity war fighting.
With Europeans skeptical of such a prominent role of the use of force -
as evident during the Iraq crisis - different conceptual orientations
can be a burden to a common transatlantic understanding on the scope,
utility and role of transformation. American security pundits
increasingly acknowledge the need to adjust the U.S. transformation
trajectory. Otherwise future coalition operations will be even more at
risk. As recent operations in Iraq have shown U.S. forces are hardly
interoperable with even its closest allies. Most experts agree that a
division of labor, with the U.S. engaged in high-intensity conflict and
Europeans taking care of peacekeeping, is no design to sustain
long-term transatlantic cohesion. U.S. transformation focus on the
concept of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is likely to increase the
problem. Apart from divergent transatlantic views on the utility and
limits of NCW in the future conflict environment, the technology and
capability gap could widen due to impediments in arms co-operation and
different trends in defense budgets.
Moreover, the issue of transformation also affects the relationship
between NATO and ESDP. There is a growing tendency in the U.S. to
consider European efforts to develop own military assets necessary for
independent risk assessment and decision-making an unnecessary
duplication at least and a policy eventually leading to transatlantic
rivalry at worst. Especially in the context of NCW the European
development of independent C4ISR capabilities can have profound
implications for the interoperability required in future operations.
European states on the other hand perceive U.S. transformation to be
increasingly decoupled from its own security interests. The defense
transformation thus needs to be augmented by new transatlantic
mechanisms of U.S. global leadership. In case of failure,
transformation can well contribute to the strategic divide currently
affecting transatlantic relations. This dialogue will focus on ways to
reconcile the divergent transatlantic approaches to force
transformation.
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